Keys To Victory in BtB
Wargames, like warfare at a high level of abstraction, are exercises in risk management. Both sides maneuver their pieces in such a way to maximize the probability of success given various uncertainties. The typical “random number generator” that introduces uncertainty in game outcomes is the die. But in Card Driven Games (CDG), an additional source of uncertainty is the luck of the draw. Due to this additional uncertainty, CDG produce a level of intensity and analysis that is not often matched in more traditional game systems. CDG also afford players more ways to “explain” why they won or, as is more likely, why they lost. Hindsight is 20-20 and after the war (game) is over, it is easy in a CDG to place the blame on chance more so than in a more traditional game—there are more opportunities to construct plausible narratives for how the game outcome could have gone in one’s favor if only a few cards had been drawn at different times. And to be fair, risk management in CDG is much more difficult than in traditional games.
In GMT’s WWII: Barbarossa to Berlin, the beginning of the game is always a nail biter. The Axis rush to collapse the Soviet Union and gain the AV before the Soviets can stiffen with the help of their reinforcements and take the initiative. The card sequences at the beginning of the game produce a fertile ground for post-game rationalizations about how things could have been different if the cards had been drawn differently. This is because there are so many key cards—the Soviet Front reinforcements, Taifun, Guderian, Panzer Refit, Industrial Evacuation to name the top ones.
The BTB PBEM tournaments offer a great opportunity to test just how critical these cards are and whether the card sequencing dominates who wins more than player decisions. In the 2007 PBEM event, I saved the game files for all tournament games and entered the final 48 games (rounds 2 to 7) into a database to see what cards and key events correlated with victory. The article that follows is an analysis on what key events are most related to victory.
Potential Key Events
Here is a summary of the cards and key events that were assessed:
SW Front violates SF: It is standard Axis play to put a SF marker on the SW front in Lwow to start the game. The Soviet player then faces a choice--he can leave the SW front there to avoid the SF penalty, he can attack with SW front and hope that it can "advance" to the rear (avoiding the SF penalty but probably taking a step loss in the process) or he can take the SF penalty and move the SW front to a better position. If the SW front is left in Lwow it will likely be isolated and the Soviets will lose their only mech unit until the Mech Fronts or tanks arrive. So the question here, is what is the impact of taking the SF penalty?
Mulligan: If the Allies do not draw a Soviet Front reinforcement card, then they may have to discard some 4 or even 5OP cards in order to guarantee drawing a reinforcement card on turn 2. While this burns through the deck it also sets up an imbalance with what the Axis player can do (he can discard his 2OP and 3OP cards to maximize his OPS for turn 2). Does taking the Mulligan have an impact?
AL 5OPS Turn 1: The Allies almost always have plenty of uses for a 5OP card on turn 1 but there is no guarantee that you will draw one. What happens if you are stuck with no 5 OP cards?
Stalin KIA: The 4VPs for capturing Stalin are huge. Note: that several games are conceded when Stalin's capture seems (or is) unavoidable--these games are assumed to have resulted in Stalin's capture for the analysis below.
Moscow Taken: Moscow is often the focus of the Axis campaign--what impact does losing Moscow have (independent of losing Stalin)?
Guderian played: During the 1941 campaign, the play of Guderian can really bust a hole in the Soviet line.
Industrial Evac played: IE seems like a pretty critical event--without IE, there are no tank armies and no 8 card hands for the Allies.
Turn 2 OPS Axis OPs advantage: If the Axis get significantly more OPS than the Allies on turn 2, is it curtains for the Soviets? This event compares the total OPS value of all cards played (regardless of how they card was used) for both sides. If the Axis OPS total is 2 or more than the Allies then the Axis are considered to have a significant advantage.
4 Front Reinforcement on Turn 2: It seems like getting the 4 Front reinforcement on turn 2 is significantly better than having only the 3 Front.
4 Front Ref on turn 2, 3 Front on turn 3: The best ordering of the Soviet reinforcements is the 4 front first and then the 3 Front.
Stalin SRed out: Many players figure that Stalin must be SRed out for the Soviets to have a chance.
Results
For each of these events, the Axis winning percentage was computed for games in which the event occurred and games in which it did not occur. To the extent these percentages differed, that event could be deemed as a determinant of victory. If the percentages were similar, then it doesn’t matter whether that particular event occurred or not in determining who wins.
| # Games | AX Win % | ||||
| Event Occurs? | No | Yes | No | Yes | Impact |
| Industrial Evac | 17 | 31 | 88% | 42% | -46% |
| Stalin SRed out | 34 | 14 | 47% | 86% | 39% |
| Stalin KIA | 33 | 15 | 48% | 80% | 32% |
| Mulligan | 21 | 27 | 43% | 70% | 28% |
| T2 Axis OPs advantage | 21 | 27 | 43% | 70% | 28% |
| Moscow taken | 30 | 18 | 50% | 72% | 22% |
| Guderian | 17 | 31 | 65% | 55% | -10% |
| SW violate SF? | 27 | 21 | 56% | 62% | 6% |
| 4 front ref t2, 3 front t3 | 35 | 13 | 60% | 54% | -6% |
| AL 5OP turn 1 | 8 | 40 | 63% | 58% | -5% |
| 4 Front Ref played turn 2 | 21 | 27 | 57% | 59% | 2% |
The results have been sorted by the absolute value of the “impact” column. The impact is the difference in Axis winning percentage between whether the event occurs or not. For example, if IE is played as an event, the Axis win 42% of the games. If it is not played, the Axis win 88%--this makes the impact -46% (42%-86%).
What Doesn’t Matter
Let’s start with what doesn’t seem to matter—mainly events that occur very early in the game. The five lowest impactful events are “SW violate SF”, the optimal SU Front Reinforcement schedule (4 Front, 3 Front), the Allies getting a 5OP card on turn 1, whether the Allies get a 4 Front card for turn 2 and Guderian. Saving the SW mech front for a VP seems to be balanced as you might think. What is surprising though is that the sequence of Soviet Front Reinforcements and whether the Allies get 5 OPs on turn 1 don’t seem to matter. Finally Guderian always feels like a line buster but in the aggregate, this event isn’t that impactful—obviously how one uses this event has a greater impact than just being able to play it.
Moderately impactful events
The next tier of events includes Stalin KIA, the Mulligan, an Axis Turn 2 OPs advantage and the fall of Moscow. Arguably the most surprising result is that losing Stalin is not the biggest predictor of victory and falls in the middle tier. The Mulligan and Axis Turn 2 OPs advantage are somewhat related in that when the Allies take the Mulligan, they may often have to dump a 4 or 5 OP card. This will increase the chances that the Axis get an OPs advantage of 2 or more on turn 2. Clearly if the Axis get a super hand and the Allies get a sub-par hand the Axis have an advantage so this is one post game rationalization that would have some merit. Taking Moscow, like Stalin being eliminated, is in the middle of the pack in terms of impactfulness.
The Key Events
Two events stand out from all the others in their impactfulness—IE and SRing Stalin. Players have long suspected that the key to Allied victory is the play of Industrial Evacuation—the tank armies allow the Soviets to start the counter-offensive before the Mech Fronts arrive and the extra card gives the Allies flexibility to plan invasions and avoid playing 2OP cards late in the game.
What seems to go against conventional wisdom though is the SRing of Stalin. Many players SR Stalin early in the game to save the 4VPs from what is perceived to be his eventual fate if he stays in Moscow. In theory this seems like a good risk mitigation strategy—you are minimizing the chances of losing Stalin and not taking the risk that the trench roll for Moscow will hit on the first try and that the Soviets can keep a supply line open until winter. But in practice, it appears that taking the riskier path (keeping Stalin in Moscow) is the better approach. Of the 14 games in which Stalin was SRed out, the Axis won 12 games.
SRing Stalin a Mistake?
What does the data look like if we “cross” these two key events (i.e., look at the four possible combinations of outcomes)?
| Stalin SRed | IE played | AX record | Pct |
| No | No | 8-2 | 80% |
| No | Yes | 8-16 | 33% |
| Yes | No | 7-0 | 100% |
| Yes | Yes | 5-2 | 71% |
These sample sizes are obviously small but there is a pretty clear pattern in that the Axis have a clear advantage in 3 of the four possible outcomes—the Allies having the advantage when Stalin stays in Moscow and IE is played. These games are probably ones in which the Axis get stopped in 1941 and are not able to push towards the Urals and are not able to isolate or destroy much of the Soviet army.
If SRing Stalin helps the Axis win, the next question is does SRing Stalin save Stalin from capture (presumably the point of SRing him)?
| Stalin SRed | No | Yes | % Stalin KIA |
| No | 21 | 13 | 38% |
| Yes | 12 | 2 | 14% |
| Total | 33 | 15 | 31% |
Yes, SRing Stalin to safety reduces the chances of his capture from 38% to 14% but clearly, it is not a sure proposition.
So why does SRing Stalin lead to such poor results for the Allies and can the pattern seen above be “broken”—in other words, can the Allies win on a more consistent basis without IE or by SRing Stalin to safety and can the Axis win on a more consistent basis if the initial offensive is blunted?
One reason why SRing Stalin is such a disaster for the Allies is that often, in the process of SRing Stalin out, the Soviets lose their army. Stalin is saved but the Germans either beat up on fronts that can’t retreat during the SR rounds or breakthrough and isolate large swaths of the Soviet Union. In fact, if the Soviets SR Stalin or lose him in Moscow, the Axis post a 22-5 record (81% winning percentage). But if Stalin is not captured nor SRed, the Allies post a 15-6 record (71%). Staying home and defending Moscow seems to be the most effective strategy.
If the Allies hold both SU Front Reinforcement events and a couple of 4 or 5 OP cards in turn 2, then defending Moscow seems like a doable proposition. But despite the numbers presented above, getting a poor Allied hand on turn 1 or turn 2 and not having the assurance that a second reinforcement event will be available in fall, does not seem like a situation where Moscow would be defensible against competent Axis play. The question is can the Allies survive this situation on a consistent basis and do the Axis have a sufficient counter?
Since we are on the verge of a tournament, I’ll close at this point. The short answer though is that I think the Allies do have an answer, but I have yet to find a viable counter for the Axis! Let the games begin…