WargameReplays

Replay of Grant Takes Command,
The Overland Campaign (Scenario 9)

This was my first GTC campaign game of GTC and got me back into the series after a 4 year hiatus. The GTC campaign immediately hooked me as the most interesting campaign game in the series. I originally wrote this replay for a Consimworld posting before thinking of taking ditigal pic's of the game in progress. Thus, unlike my other replays, this one is pictureless.

RAINY START (May 4-7)

The Union started off slow with below average movement rolls on May 4. Pontoons were placed at Germanna Ford and Ely’s Ford. Meanwhile, the Confederates converged on the Wilderness. May 5th dawned with a Rain+2 result. This slowed down both sides considerably. During the rain storm, the AoP completed its crossings of the Rapidan, with the II and V corps crossing at Germanna and the VI corps crossing at Ely’s. The AoP deployed along the pike between Germanna Ford and Wilderness Church with the V corps holding the western flank and the VI the eastern flank. The IX corps used strategic movement to march through Fauquier county on its way to Scotts Dam Ford (which, since it is a dam, can be crossed during rain). The Confederates seemed to be more harmed by the rain than the Federals. It became apparent that the Yanks would be able to slip through the Wilderness unmolested unless the Confederates marched hard during the rain in order to cut them off around Chancellorsville. Ewell guarded the road through Parker’s Store while Longstreet and Hill moved on Chancellorsville. During the first strategic cycle, Butler’s +2 attack on Port Walthall Junction resulted in a -3 result! A Major Defeat! Butler and Sigel went passive.

BATTLE OF SECOND CHANCELLORSVILLE (May 8-11)

When clear weather dawned on May 8, the Confederate line ran from Wilderness Tavern to Hazel Grove in the woods hexes south of the pike. Confederate units started entrenching which used up fatigues. Rather than attacking entrenched positions directly, Grant shifted his troops east along the pike in preparation for an assault on the Confederate right flank. Battle erupts on May 9th west of Chancellorsville near Wilderness Church over the same ground of Jackson’s Great Flank March almost one year earlier. The initial attacks by Hancock’s II corps were repulsed and left Hancock mortally wounded (Humphreys took command of the II corps). The next day, the V Corps was sent from the Union right flank on a flanking maneuver behind the Union line to the Confederate right flank. Ewell’s corps reacted by moving southeast. Meanwhile, the II and VI corps attacked Hill and Longstreet’s corps, driving back Longstreet’s command and one of Hill’s divisions. Lee’s position in the Wilderness was no longer tenable and he ordered a general withdrawal towards Spotsylvania Court House. The V Corps was able to cut-off the most direct round to Spotsylvania Court House (Brock Road) and even surrounded E Johnson’s division of Ewell’s corps. The Confederate army was strung out and in disarray. At this point, a second Rain+2 event intervened slowing the Union enough to allow Lee to escape without further damage. The Confederate cavalry showed poorly during the battle with one of F Lee’s brigades being eliminated during a retreat. While the battle raged in the Wilderness, Burnside’s corps crossed the Rappahannock at Scott’s Dam Ford, moved through Tabernacle Church and marched south to Spotsylvania Court House. When the Rain started, the IX corps was just east of the Ni River. During the strategic cycle, the Union placed a depot on its build side Fredericksburg.

RETREAT TO THE PO (May 12-15)

When the rain lifted, Lee determined that while the Confederates could probably take Spotsylvania Court House from the IX corps, the position was not defensible and his army was still disorganized from the hard marching in the rain to the Wilderness and the ensuing battle. Sheridan probed the crossings along the Po and skirmished with Stuart. Lee moved south of the Po and was able to cover the crossings with entrenched units before Grant could secure a crossing. By May 15th, the Confederate line stretched from Andrew’s bridge to Stannard’s Mill. During the Strategic Cycle, the Union completed the depot in Fredericksburg. Sigel moved south to New Market and suffered a major defeat. Butler continued his passive stance.

BATTLE OF WRIGHT CHAPEL (May 16-19)

Direct attacks across the Po were out of the question so Grant slid east and south again so as to keep between Lee and his supply line which would be shifting to Port Royal. The II and V corps led the way, crossing the Po at Milford. In reaction to Grant’s flanking move, Lee had sent Ewell’s corps south to cut-off the Union troops from Hanover Junction. Hill followed Ewell and clashed with the Union VI corps as it crossed Downer’s Bridge. Wright’s division was routed but the Confederates were unable to follow-up their success. As the Confederates moved south to Hanover Junction, Longstreet’s two divisions formed the rear guard. After the Confederates left their entrenchments along the Po, Burnside’s IX corps crossed at Quisenberry and caught Kershaw napping at Lebanon Church. The Union flank attack was inconclusive but resulted in the loss of Burnside. Wilcox assumed command. With Kershaw’s division entangled with the IX corps, Lee had to halt his retreat so that Kershaw’s division would not be defeated in detail. Ewell’s corps was forced to make a stand at Wright Chapel while Longstreet extracted Kershaw from his predicament. The Union II and V corps routed two of Ewell’s divisions. Before the Yankees could seal overrun the Confederate line, Hill’s corps counterattacked, routing two divisions of the II corps. Rain once again intervened to stymie Union offensive operations and allow Lee to successfully retreat.

Coincident with the Union flanking maneuver along the Po, Sheridan’s cavalry was sent south on a raiding mission. Stuart withdrew to Hanover Junction (location of a Confederate depot). Sheridan crossed the Pamunkey at near Wickham’s station and clashed with F. Lee’s troopers near Ashland. As Stuart moved south to intercept Sheridan, the Union troopers completed their circle around Hanover Junction by moving north via Hanover Academy. Sheridan set-up a +3 flanking attack on Hanover Junction but the day ended on a 1-1 initiative before he could launch the attack. The next day, the same rain that saved Lee’s army near Wright Chapel, prevented Sheridan from attacking Hanover Depot. Ewell’s men soon arrived and Sheridan withdrew to the west. All was quiet in the Valley and in the Bermuda Hundred. Pickett’s division deployed to Richmond and after Confederate reorganization on the 19th formed into a division and marched north to join the Army of Northern Virginia. The Union depot in Fredericksburg was dismantled and a new Union depot was placed in Port Royal. (The Union depot in Culpeper had been destroyed earlier by Mosby’s Raiders.)

BATTLE OF HANOVER COURTHOUSE (May 20-23)

The rain of the 18th and 19th allowed the Confederates to safely cross the North Anna and take up defensive positions near Hanover Junction. Union units moved up to the North Anna and rested from the previous several days of hard marching and fighting. Lee did not cover the crossings to the west of Ox Ford. Grant however determined to continue to slide to the east and south. Once again, the II and V corps led the way and were able to cross the Pamunkey at Little Page Bridge. Pickett joined Longstreet’s corps which was sent to attack the invading forces. Hill’s corps followed while Ewell’s corps defended the crossings near Hanover Junction. The battle of Hanover Courthouse (or Meehump’s Creek) proved to be Lee’s greatest victory of the campaign. Before the Union units could get into position and entrench, the Confederates won a long series of initiative rolls. Longstreet assaulted the southern end of the Union line and rolled up the flank. The entire II corps was routed and retreated back across the river. One division of the V corps was routed, two were pushed back across the river and the fourth withdrew. Grant was forced to refit and reconsider how to cross the Pamunkey safely as Lee covered the crossings from Wickham’s Station to Newcastle Ferry. In the Bermuda Hundred Butler suffers major defeat at Port Walthall Station (again). Hunter arrives in Valley and proceeded to go active. All of the Special Confederate Valley reinforcements were activated and Crook’s units passed their activation roll and would arrive May 31st. The depot in Port Royal was completed and projected supply into Hanover County.

CROSSING THE PAMUNKEY (May 24-27)

Lee realized that he would not be able to prevent the AoP from crossing somewhere on the Pamunkey but he could force the crossing to be as far east as possible. This is essentially what happened. As the II and V corps licked their wounds, the VI corps pushed on to the east, crossing at Basset’s Ferry. The rest of the Union army followed, crossing also at Newcastle and Piping Tree Ferries. The Union forces formed a line a few miles south of the river and entrenched until the entire army could cross and bridges were secured behind them (pontoons were laid across all three ferries used for crossing). Rather than counterattacking, Lee instead formed a strong defensive line behind Matadequin creek, anchored on the right by Heth’s division at Lipscomb’s Store and following the creek to the northwest. Longstreet’s corps held the center of the line and Ewell withdrew from the Hanover Junction area to form the left flank. Because of the deliberateness of the Union crossing, the Confederates were able to entrench up to Fort status along much of the line. After the Confederate forces had evacuated from northern Hanover County, Sheridan’s troopers were able to destroy the dismantled depot in Hanover Junction. No Union depots were placed in preparation for sending much of the XVIII corps to New Kent County. Hunter moved into New Market which the Confederates had evacuated in the last strategic cycle. Breckinridge was withdrawn to Richmond to guard the Capital depot and release Hoke’s division for service with the main army.

RACE TO SUMMIT’S STATION (May 28-31)

Realizing that a frontal assault would be futile, Grant called his favorite play from the playbook. The V corps moved SE to the Richmond and York River RR line and then along the line to Summit’s station. The VI corps slid around Heth’s division at Lipscomb’s Store so as to seal off Hill’s corps from reacting to the V corps’ maneuver. As anticipated, Warren’s flank march caused Lee to leave his entrenchments and move south. Ewell marched from the Confederate left flank to Summit’s station and dug in before Warren could arrive. The V corps began to slide south, while the II corps fell into line between the VI corps to the north and the V corps to the south. In fighting around Summit’s station, two of Ewell’s understrengthed divisions and two of Longstreet’s divisions were routed. The Confederates once again withdrew in a disorderly fashion to behind the Chickahominy. Two divisions of the XVIII corps were shipped to White House Landing. Hunter and Crook capture Staunton and a Union depot was placed at White House Landing.

TO THE GATES OF RICHMOND (June 1-4)

Sheridan’s troopers secured the Meadow bridges and dug-in. The II and V corps crossed and pressed Lee’s army as it withdrew towards Richmond. The VI and IX corps threatened to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge and Grapevine Ford, forcing Lee to perform a fighting withdrawal to the redoubts in front of Richmond. Unable to maneuver to turn Lee out of his entrenchments, Grant started his assault on redoubt line in the south with Warren’s corps which was quickly repulsed. The northern end of the line near the Chickahominy was probed by the VI and IX corps. Rickett’s and two divisions of the IX corps successfully captured a redoubt but a Confederate counterattack routed the Union force. A second Union attack captured another redoubt and was followed up with a third assault taking an adjacent depot. The Confederate line was compromised and Lee withdrew to the ring of forts east of Richmond. A 1-1 initiative roll ended the June 4th turn early and prevented the Union from assaulting the fort line and possibly entering Richmond. While the battle raged to the east of Richmond, Sheridan’s corps moved north of the Chickhominy and attacked Richmond from the west. Sheridan destroyed five forts on the north and western side of Richmond. Stuart covered the capital depot and formed a secondary line with Walker’s division. Hunter was repulsed at Lexington and Butler was defeated again in Port Walthall Junction. Union losses to this point in the campaign had been high and a the Union needed a roll of 9+ for the game to continue or face a 93 VP Confederate victory. The game end roll was 9 and the battle continued onto what looked like a certain Union victory.

STALEMATE AND DEFEAT (June 5-8)

Lee’s forces to the east of Richmond were able to entrench early on the 5th limiting Grant’s options. Sheridan’s forces had cleared a path free of forts to the north of Richmond and Grant took advantage of this by sending the II corps on a flanking maneuver around the capital. The II corps moved quickly and was past the redoubts and destroyed forts before the Confederates could react. It looked certain that the Union would invest Richmond but before the II corps could press its advantage or other Union units could reinforce them, the turn ended on a 1-1 initiative. Lee reacted by counterattacking the II corps and holding the line east of Richmond with single divisions of 6-8 manpower entrenched to fort status. First Longstreet attempted a head on assault that would have flanked the II corps line. The grand assault roll failed and so did Longstreet’s attack. Next, Lee sent Ewell’s corps west out of Richmond to flank Birney’s division which held the right flank of the southern facing Union II Corps. Ewell was able to drive back Birney’s division and outflanked Mott’s division which was routed by Lee and Hill. Again before the Union to react and reinforce the II corps, the day ended early on a 1-1 initiative roll. June 7th opened with the Union winning several initiatives and setting up a key attack on the apex of the Confederate line that was formed by the northern and eastern facing units. F Lee and Walker’s entrenched troops held and as the II corps licked its wounds, Union offensive operations were limited. The V corps moved from southeast of Richmond towards the apex of the Confederate line. On the 8th, the Union attempted a couple of unsuccessful frontal assaults. It was at this point that I realized that the Upton Special Assault marker had not been used. Upton made the most of his appearance as two divisions and a brigade were routed and a hole was blown in the line east of Richmond. The IX corps poured through the hole and two of its divisions entered Richmond. If the Union had won one more initiative, the capital depot would have been captured. Lee won the key initiative and eventually counterattacked the IX corps units routing them back behind Union lines. Hunter captured Lexington during the strategic cycle. The Union needed to roll an 11 or more to continue the game but rolled a 2. Grant’s bid to take Richmond had failed as the Union army’s morale was finally broken.

AFTERMATH

Union casualties were horrific in this campaign. The Union suffered casualties of 74,500 compared to Confederate losses of 35,000. Early in the campaign, Butler’s forces were defeated decisively and later in the campaign, Grant had to rely on more and more frontal assaults. Because of the high losses, Halleck was moved to send massive replacements and Grant received 41,000 replacements over the course of the campaign.

The final victory point tally:

COMMENTARY

Editor's note: These were my initial thoughts after this first playing. Several other playings have altered some of the insights below.

Having solitaired all the campaign games at least twice (except for GTC [this was my first play through] and SIV [played campaign once]), this was by far the most fun and most challenging for both sides. In the other games of the series, the margin of error for the Union army is small and the Confederates can quickly turn the tide of the game with some timely attacks. In GTC, the Union army is not as fragile and if anything it is the Confederate army that is fragile. This is due to the organization of the Union army (see below) and the shear number of replacements that can be obtained. Thus, the Union can be more aggressive in this game without risking total defeat. The Confederates can’t attack as aggressively compared to other games in the series, but the challenge is to know what to defend and when to launch the timely counterattack. In fact one of the interesting strategic choices for the Confederates is to *not* take advantage of your initiative advantage. Early in a turn it is tempting to activate each time the Confederates win the initiative but it is dangerous to do so. This is because once the Confederate troops have burned fatigues and committed themselves to moving to certain locations or digging the Union can react with impunity. Because of the Union size and organization, the Confederates will be on the strategic defensive most of the game and it is to their advantage to react to Union moves instead of committing early in the turn. To both sides, the entrenchment activations make the tactical decisions much more interesting. If you entrench you enhance your defensive ability but you also limit your ability to react to a flanking maneuver. Thus, it is not always a “no brainer” to dig.

The other aspect of GTC that I like, is that the organization of the Union army makes the them much more competitive than in previous games of the series. The AoP is formed into three corps making it much more mobile than the 7 corps organization in SLB or RTG. This means that the main Union force can move in as many activations as the ANV. In previous games, not only would the Confederates win more initiatives they would be able to move their entire army in fewer activations. A second organizational change for the Union is the cavalry corps. I like to refer to Sheridan’s boys as the panzer corps. They may not have the firepower of a panzer corps (though later in the campaign they can match up with some of the understrengthed Confederate divisions), but their mobility and size make them one of the key Union weapons.

In my replay, the rain early on seemed to help the Union which was able to move south much faster than Grant did historically. The rain prevented the Confederates from bottling the Union up in the Wilderness or getting in front of the Union forces and entrenching as they moved south past Spotsylvania. The key for the Confederates was the Union rout at Hanover Court House. Not only did that delay the Union advance by about 4 days, it also pushed it further east and further from Richmond. This proved to buy enough time for Lee to eventually run out the clock. The Union probably should have won after passing the game end roll on June 4th but the two early endings on the 5th and 6th really limited their chances. I was surprised how difficult it was to crack the Richmond perimeter against the ANV. The entrenchments and interior lines proved to be too formidable.

The only play balance issue that I observed was the VP value for Hanover County. +10 seems too high because once the Union flanks to the SE, the Confederates really can’t leave any units in Hanover Junction. If they do, the Union can cut those forces off and destroy them. If Hanover Junction is evacuated, then it becomes too easy for the Union to occupy unopposed. The value of an intact Hanover Junction is already modeled well in the game. If a depot can be built at Hanover Junction, it supplies more counties than one built at White House Landing and while it is being built, troops from the Bermuda Hundred can be shipped to New Kent County. A lower value of +3 seems more appropriate.

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